Secure Deployment & Hardening of Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Projects — Part III
Aligned with CIS Google Cloud Platform Benchmark
CIS Section 2 — Logging and Monitoring
Logging and monitoring form the detection, accountability and forensic backbone of any secure GCP deployment.
Without comprehensive logging:
- Privileged activity becomes invisible
- Lateral movement is undetectable
- Incident response is severely limited
- Regulatory and audit requirements cannot be met
Security Principle
In cloud environments, “If it is not logged, it effectively did not happen.”
Control 2.1
Ensure That Cloud Audit Logging Is Configured Properly Across All Projects
CIS ID: 2.1
- Section: Logging and Monitoring
- Severity: Critical
- Automatable: Yes
- Check Type: gcloud
Purpose & Risk
Cloud Audit Logs capture:
- Administrative activity
- IAM changes
- Policy modifications
- Service configuration updates
Disabling or misconfiguring these logs results in:
- No accountability for privileged actions
- No forensic trail after compromise
- Inability to meet compliance requirements
This is a direct detection and governance failure.
Secure Configuration Guidance
Ensure the following logs are enabled for all projects:
- Admin Activity (always on)
- Data Access (for critical services)
- System Events
- Policy Denied
Prefer:
- Organization-level configuration
- Centralised export to a logging project
Implementation Notes
Audit logging configuration:
gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID \
--format=json
Check:
- AuditConfig entries
- Disabled log types
- Exclusions
For organization:
gcloud logging sinks list --organization=ORG_ID
Operational Considerations
- Enable Data Access logs at least for:
- IAM
- KMS
- Storage
- BigQuery
- Monitor: Logging exclusions, Sink failures, Retention changes
Control 2.2
Ensure That Cloud Audit Logs Are Retained for a Minimum Period
CIS ID: 2.2
- Section: Logging and Monitoring
- Severity: High
- Automatable: Yes
- Check Type: gcloud
Purpose & Risk
Short log retention leads to:
- Loss of forensic evidence
- Inability to investigate delayed detections
- Compliance violations
Attackers frequently:
- Remain dormant for weeks
- Perform slow privilege escalation
Short retention windows directly reduce detection capability.
Secure Configuration Guidance
Recommended minimum retention:
- 90 days for operational security
- 180–365 days for compliance and forensics
Apply retention at:
- Logging bucket level
- Central logging project
Implementation Notes
Audit retention policies:
gcloud logging buckets describe _Default \
--location=global
Check:
- retentionDays
- locked status
Operational Considerations
- Use: Central logging project, Immutable retention for critical logs
- Export to: SIEM, Long-term archive (Coldline / BigQuery)
Control 2.3
Ensure That Log Exports Are Configured for Security Monitoring
CIS ID: 2.3
- Section: Logging and Monitoring
- Severity: High
- Automatable: Yes
- Check Type: gcloud
Purpose & Risk
Local-only logging introduces:
- Single point of failure
- Tampering risk
- No SOC visibility
Central export enables:
- Cross-project correlation
- SIEM ingestion
- Threat detection
- Compliance reporting
Secure Configuration Guidance
Configure:
- Organization-level sinks
- Export destinations: SIEM, BigQuery, Storage
Export at least:
- Admin Activity
- IAM changes
- Network logs
- Firewall logs
Implementation Notes
Audit sinks:
gcloud logging sinks list --organization=ORG_ID
Check:
- Destination type
- Included log types
- Sink permissions
Operational Considerations
- Protect sinks from deletion
- Monitor: Sink errors, Export latency
- Validate ingestion into SOC tooling
Control 2.4
Ensure That VPC Flow Logs Are Enabled for All Subnets
CIS ID: 2.4
- Section: Logging and Monitoring
- Severity: High
- Automatable: Yes
- Check Type: gcloud
Purpose & Risk
Without flow logs:
- Network lateral movement is invisible
- Exfiltration paths are hidden
- No traffic baselining is possible
This significantly weakens:
- Detection engineering
- Incident response
- Network forensics
Secure Configuration Guidance
Enable VPC Flow Logs on:
- All production subnets
- All shared VPC subnets
- All sensitive workloads
Prefer:
- Full metadata
- Sampling disabled or low
Implementation Notes
Audit subnets:
gcloud compute networks subnets list \
--format="table(name,region,enableFlowLogs)"
Identify:
- Subnets with enableFlowLogs = false
Operational Considerations
- Balance: Visibility vs cost
- Export flow logs to: SIEM, BigQuery
- Correlate with: Firewall logs, Threat intel
Control 2.5
Ensure That Firewall Rules Logging Is Enabled
CIS ID: 2.5
- Section: Logging and Monitoring
- Severity: Medium
- Automatable: Yes
- Check Type: gcloud
Purpose & Risk
Without firewall logging:
- Blocked attacks are invisible
- Misconfigurations go unnoticed
- No visibility into rule effectiveness
This reduces:
- Network security posture awareness
- Attack detection capability
Secure Configuration Guidance
Enable logging for:
- Ingress deny rules
- High-risk allow rules
- Internet-facing rules
Prefer:
- Logging on all perimeter rules
Implementation Notes
Audit firewall rules:
gcloud compute firewall-rules list \
--format="table(name,network,direction,logConfig.enable)"
Identify:
- Rules with logging disabled
Operational Considerations
- Monitor: Repeated denies, Unexpected allows
- Use logs for: Threat hunting, Rule optimisation
Next: CIS Section 3 — Networking
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